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But the 436-summon forth report by the Air Force Office of Special Investigations also found that Gul had become increasingly radicalized in new years, had attended an extremist mosque in Pakistan and told relatives that he wanted to “administer the coup de gr Americans.” Some Afghan military leaders told U.S. investigators that they were alarmed by his changed views and carriage, yet there was no sign that they did anything to intervene.
The April 27 rampage was the deadliest censure on U.S. Air Force personnel since 1996, when a truck bomb blew up the Khobar Towers quarters complex in Saudi Arabia, killing 19 U.S service members.
Most of those who died in the Kabul spasm were assigned to training the fledgling Afghan Air Force, and their deaths fanned fears that insurgents had once again infiltrated the ranks of the Afghan military.
The skirmish underscored the risks and fragility of the Obama administration’s design to train and expand Afghan security forces loyal to President Hamid Karzai so they can fill the put aside left by departing U.S. and NATO troops. While Afghan officials are required to screen recruits and have beefed up counterintelligence programs to detect Taliban sympathizers, acts of divulging have undermined trust between Afghan forces and their coalition trainers.
Source: Washington Post